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SUMMARY 
 
The loss of the “Green Lily” in 1997 is used as a case study to highlight the characteristics of escalating crises. As in 
similar safety critical industries, these situations are unpredictable events that may require co-ordinated but flexible and 
creative responses from individuals and teams working in stressful conditions. Fundamental skill requirements for crisis 
management are situational awareness and decision making. This paper reviews the naturalistic decision making (NDM) 
model for insights into the nature of these skills and considers the optimal training regimes to cultivate them. The paper 
concludes with a review of the issues regarding the assessment of crisis management skills and current research into the 
determination of behavioural markers for measuring competence.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the year 2000, the Maritime Coastguard Agency 
(MCA), following a recommendation of the Marine 
Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) in response to the 
loss of the “Green Lily”, awarded a research project to 
Warsash Maritime Centre to investigate the potential use 
of simulators for training in the handling of escalating 
emergencies (MCA Project RP467).  This project 
enabled the research team to review current concepts and 
models in the field of crisis management across a range 
of safety critical industries and to conduct a survey of 
expert opinion on the optimal training and assessment 
regimes for handling escalating emergencies. This paper 
describes some of the findings of that project. In 
particular, the paper addresses the following issues: 
 
x What are the characteristics of crises and how do 
they differ from emergencies? 
x What are the skill requirements for crisis 
management? 
x What are the essential requirements of a training 
system to foster these skills? 
x What forms of simulation offer the optimal training 
regimes for crisis management? 
x What are the issues to be resolved in the assessment 
of competence in these skills? 
 
The paper concludes with a description of current 
research being conducted at Warsash in the use of 
behavioural markers for assessing competence. 
 
 
2. A CASE STUDY: THE “GREEN LILY” 
 
On 18th November 1997, the 3,624 grt Bahamian 
registered vessel “Green Lily” sailed from Lerwick in the 
Shetland Islands with a cargo of frozen fish for the Ivory 
Coast.  The weather on departure was bad with wind 
speeds increasing to severe gale force 9. The following 
morning, while hove to about 15 miles south-east of the 
island of Bressay in the Shetland Isles in storm force 10 
winds, a sea water supply line fractured in the engine 
room. The engineers controlled the flooding and 
pumping out had begun when the main engine stopped. 
Unsuccessful attempts were made to restart the engine 
while the vessel drifted northwards towards Bressay.  
Shetland Coastguard was advised and three tugs, the 
Lerwick RNLI lifeboat and a coastguard helicopter 
prepared to proceed to the casualty. 
 
Attempts were made by two of the tugs to secure a line 
and tow the “Green Lily” away from land but although 
initially successful, each line parted.  The starboard 
anchor was released and the third tug attempted to snag 
the cable and pull her head to wind, but the cable parted.  
At this time, the lifeboat rescued five crewmen, including 
two injured, from the ship’s deck. The ten remaining 
crew members were rescued by the Coastguard 
helicopter but the winchman, who had remained on the 
deck of the ship, was swept into the sea and lost. The 
“Green Lily” went aground and started to break up. The 
investigation by the Marine Accident Investigation 
Branch (MAIB), published in June 1999, advised the 
cause of the grounding was: 
 
“the lack of propulsion and failure to restart the main 
engine to arrest the drift of the vessel towards the shore 
in the prevailing environmental conditions. Contributory 
causes included flooding of the engine room, failure to 
reset the mechanical over-speed trip, inadequate 
knowledge of the cooling water system, failure of the 
towage attempts and inadequate teamwork” (MAIB, 
1999 page 9) 
 
The causal factors in this case suggest that this tragedy 
bears all the hallmarks of similar critical incidents across 
a range of safety critical industries: 
 
x An initial technical failure has precipitated events 
and has been compounded by a hostile environment 
and further technical problems and failures. The 
situation was escalating in severity. An emergency 
was becoming a crisis, but the actors in this tragedy 
did not have the benefit of hindsight to read the 
script. 
 
x The available emergency plans, which tend to be 
procedures based on single failures, were not 
applicable. The individuals involved were forced to 
fall back on their experience to cope with an 
increasingly complex and unpredictable set of 
circumstances. 
 
x Initial diagnosis of the technical failure was incorrect 
and led to a faulty but persistent mental model of the 
situation. In this case, the chief and second 
engineers, together with the electrical engineer, 
failed to understand why the main engine stopped 
and were consequently unable to restart it. They 
believed that the main engine failure was due to the 
effect of the flooding, previously caused by the 
fracture of the sea suction pipe. The probable reason 
for the main engine stoppage was actually due to the 
mechanical over-speed trip either not being reset or 
reset incorrectly.  
 
x Awareness of the overall situation by individuals 
was based on incomplete or inaccurate information. 
In this case, both the Master, based on his 
calculation of drift, and the engineers were over 
optimistic in their belief that a tow would be 
available before the ship ran aground. Meanwhile, 
the skippers of the rescue craft had unexpressed 
reservations about various aspects of the operation 
including the appropriateness of some of the towing 
gear, the weather conditions and sea room, and the 
ability of the ship’s crew to handle the towlines. 
 
x Individuals and units were separated physically and 
several agencies were interacting through various 
forms of communication. In these circumstances, it 
was very difficult for the key players to 
communicate meaningfully and maintain a shared 
and agreed awareness of the rapidly changing 
situation. 
 
These characteristics of critical incidents suggest that a 
distinction may be drawn between Emergencies and their 
management and Crises and their management. This 
distinction may be summarised as follows: 
 
An Emergency can be defined as a situation outside 
normal operating parameters where corrective decisions 
and actions are based on documented procedures. In the 
maritime context, examples might be “Man overboard”, 
steering gear failure or a report of a fire in a cabin. 
Emergency procedures can be trained both at onshore 
training establishments and on board.  
 
A Crisis differs from an emergency in that successful 
decisions and actions may not necessarily be based on 
documented procedures. Appropriate pre-defined 
responses may not exist, and even if they do, in practice 
they may have conflicting requirements.  Those 
responsible for handling crises will have to think through 
the situation, and respond in creative and flexible ways. 
 This distinction between emergencies and crises has a 
significant impact on the training requirements for their 
management. Training in handling emergencies may 
simply be training in following pre-prescribed 
procedures and drills. Training in crisis management is 
likely to require a much more demanding approach to 
practise the skills required in these situations. 
So what skills are required to handle crises? There is now 
considerable evidence from both military and civilian 
sources that the main requirements are for the high-level 
cognitive skills of problem solving and decision making 
and this is discussed in more detail in Section 5. Crichton 
and Flin (2002) suggest that, at its most simplified, there 
are two fundamental and inter-related skill requirements: 
 
x Situation assessment – “what’s the problem” 
x Decision making – “what shall I do”. 
 
The following section reviews current concepts in 
decision making in critical situations. 
  
3. DECISION MAKING UNDER STRESS 
 
Modern concepts for understanding decision-making 
have progressed from classic rational choice models to 
ones that try to reflect the way decisions are actually 
made in the real world. The most influential of these 
models is called the naturalistic decision-making (NDM) 
model and has been defined as follows: 
 
“The study of NDM asks how experienced people, 
working as individuals or groups in dynamic, uncertain, 
and often fast-paced environments, identify and assess 
their situation, make decisions and take actions whose 
consequences are meaningful to them and the larger 
organisation in which they operate.” (Pruitt et al, 1997) 
 
This definition reveals a number of characteristics of the 
situations in which NDM takes place. These 
characteristics suggest that NDM is an appropriate model 
for the understanding of decision making under stress in 
escalating marine emergencies. These characteristics are: 
 
x The situations in which decisions are made are 
uncertain, unpredictable and dangerous. 
 
x Knowledge of the situation is incomplete, and 
constantly changing.  
 
x The consequences of decisions and actions based on 
poor situational awareness are potentially 
catastrophic. 
 
x Experienced people, not novices, generally conduct 
decision making in such situations.  
 
Another important feature of NDM, which reflects its 
value in understanding real world decision making, is 
that, unlike classical models of decision making, where 
the objective is to provide optimal decisions, the 
objective for real world decision makers is to arrive at 
actions based on decisions that will satisfy the immediate 
concerns of the situation, without those decisions 
necessarily having to be the best ones. There are a 
number of different models within an NDM approach to 
describe the process by which decisions are made. The 
dominant model is known as the Recognition-Primed 
Decision (RPD) model. Orasanu (1997) provides a 
comprehensive description of the process: 
 
“Its basic principle is that experts use their knowledge to 
recognise a problem situation as an instance of a type, 
and then retrieve from their store of patterns in memory 
an appropriate response associated with that particular 
problem type. The response is evaluated for adequacy in 
the present context, and if it passes, it is adopted. If it is 
found wanting, either another interpretation of the 
situation is sought or a second level response is retrieved 
and evaluated.” 
 
A number of conclusions may be drawn from this 
description of the RPD process, which are relevant to the 
handling of emergencies in stressful circumstances: 
 
x Normal control of operations is managed through a 
series of approximating or “satisficing” decisions, 
i.e. a situation is recognised as being typical and a 
number of decisions and actions taken. The situation 
is then monitored and further decisions and actions 
taken to refine the original response. 
 
x The more experienced the decision maker, the richer 
the store of experiences to draw from and the more 
extensive their repertoire of actions. Orasanu (1997) 
records a number of research studies that confirm 
that this is one of the most consistent differences 
between novices and experts. 
 
x The most critical aspect of the decision making 
process is awareness of the situation, not the 
generation of options. Orasanu (1997) also records 
that in most aviation accidents, crews have exhibited 
poor situation assessment rather than faulty selection 
of a course of action. 
 
RPD works well when the situation can be recognised, 
i.e. in normal situations. The paradox is that in 
emergency situations, just when the expert needs to draw 
on a reliable repertoire, the situation is unpredictable and 
atypical, so no repertoire can be called upon. The 
emergency handler has to revert to a creative response 
i.e. they have to think their way through the novel 
situation. 
 
It is this requirement to think through the situation that 
creates stress, which in turn may affect the quality of 
decision making. If decisions need to be made quickly, 
then time pressure also becomes an additional stressor. 
Orasanu (1997) describes the situation thus: 
 “In situations that support perception-based memory 
retrieval, stress effects should be minimal. These 
situations tend to be those that deal with familiar and 
unambiguous problems for which rule-based responses 
are available. Situations that require attentional 
scanning and impose demands on working memory are 
ones that are either unfamiliar or for which cues 
indicating a problem are ambiguous, thus requiring 
information search or diagnostic strategies.”   
 
Given the nature of decision making under stress, the 
challenge is how best can we prepare individuals and 
groups for the unpredictable or as Orasanu (1997) puts it 
– how might we strengthen the weak links? She provides 
three possible answers: through training; through better 
procedures; and through the design of better decision 
making aids.  
 
This paper is concerned with shipboard crisis 
management and the training that could evolve from that. 
So what are the implications of NDM and RPD theory 
for training? 
 
NDM and RPD theories raise a number of issues that 
suggest ways in which training may be enhanced to 
prepare people for handling escalating emergencies 
under stress (Orasanu 1997): 
 
x Decision-making is a skill. Like all skills it may be 
learned through practice. By reducing the cognitive 
load through practice, experts will be less stressed 
than novices in threatening situations. 
   
x In addition to specific skills, there is a set of more 
general decision making skills, known as 
metacognitive skills. The direct development of such 
generalised situation awareness skills might 
counteract the consequences of stress. 
 
x Educating people about stress, and providing them 
with techniques and strategies to cope with stress 
may be helpful. 
 
x Stress effects of decision making may be reduced by 
sharing the decision making process within the 
members of a team. 
 
The primary justification for the direct training for crisis 
management is based on the belief that by exposing 
individuals or teams to a variety of potential crisis 
scenarios, their mental models of situations will be 
enriched, thus enhancing their situational awareness 
techniques and their repertoires of decision making. A 
secondary justification is that by exposing people to such 
situations it provides them with the self-confidence that 
they can handle future unknown situations. 
  
The key to this approach is in the “richness” of the 
mental models developed by the individual or team, but 
paradoxically, the problem is that if the training scenarios 
are too prescriptive, then the learned repertoires may be 
inappropriate to the real emergency encountered. Crego 
and Spinks (1997) express this dilemma in their 
description of the “Minerva” simulation, which is the 
command and control training system for senior police 
officers: 
 
“It is vital that any patterns presented to the learner 
should not be reduced to individual cues…at various 
periods during the unfolding event. This behaviourist 
approach may well be successful in engendering 
recognition of a particular pattern set, but this 
recognition may not be transferable when the learner is 
faced with similar patterns in different contexts. What is 
needed is a more fluid, flexible simulation that is 
responsive to decisions made and, as a result, is very 
much driven by the actions (or indeed the inactions) of 
the participants. At the same time, unfolding incidents 
must be multi-threaded and at times parallel, if the 
impression that the learner is being led through 
prescribed problems towards pre-planned outcomes and 
solutions, is to be avoided. Only through such patterning 
and sequencing, combined with effective team driven 
communication, will the command team gain a real sense 
of ‘situational awareness’ and fidelity with the real 
world of command be sustained.” 
 
Clearly, some form of simulation offers one of the most 
beneficial training mediums for the direct learning and 
practice of situational awareness and decision making 
skills in a safe environment. In the short extract above, 
Crego and Spinks also highlight the major issues to be 
addressed in the use of simulation for the training of 
emergency handling: 
 
x To what extent will RPD type skills, learned in a 
simulated environment, transfer to the real 
emergency? 
 
x What level of context or fidelity has to be provided 
in a simulated environment to provide the sort of 
fluid, responsive simulation that is required? 
 
These issues of transfer and fidelity are addressed in the 
next section. 
 
4 TRAINING 
 
Before considering the sophistication and type of 
simulation required to address the training requirement, it 
is necessary to consider the theoretical aspects of training 
transfer and fidelity: 
 
Classic definitions of transfer (MSA Project 340,1995) 
refer to the degree to which learning to perform one task 
is made easier by the prior learning of another task. 
Simulator based training involves the systematic 
development in a simulated environment of the 
knowledge, skills and attitudes required to perform a task 
in the real world.  In this context, transfer refers to the 
degree to which learning in the real environment is made 
easier by prior learning in the simulated situation.  If the 
learning situation facilitates performance in the second 
situation, positive transfer has occurred.  If the learning 
situation impairs subsequent performance, negative 
transfer has taken place. 
 
Three complementary models of transfer are to be found 
in the literature. (Rolfe, 1991). One of the earlier 
explanations of transfer argued that positive transfer 
would occur to a second task if that task contained 
component activities that were present in the first task. 
Transfer is thus dependent on identical elements within 
both tasks.  
 
A later model argues that transfer is dependent on the 
extent to which there is similarity between the 
representation of a stimulus and the response demands of 
the learning and actual performance situations.  The 
importance of this model is that it introduces the idea that 
transfer can be obtained with simulations that are not 
replicas of the real situation. 
 
More recent approaches to transfer stress the importance 
of the trainee in the learning process. Therefore, one of 
the pre-requisites for positive transfer is the motivation 
of the trainee to acquire new skills. 
 
Total transfer is rare; i.e. some further learning in the 
operational setting is usually necessary.  Transfer is not 
uniform; some skills will transfer more readily than 
others.  Some aspects of the learning situation may 
transfer inadvertently.  By deliberately omitting some 
tasks, trainees might infer incorrectly that these tasks are 
not considered important, and then neglect them in the 
real situation.  Equally, beneficial aspects may transfer 
even though they were not specific training objectives. 
Training in teams may also influence the transfer of 
learning of individuals, for better or worse.  For example, 
if one team member dominates, others may not learn so 
much. Equally, collaboration may enhance individual 
learning and transfer. 
 
The importance of transfer in simulator training is that it 
is the key measure of the effectiveness of that training 
(Barnett, 1996). However, there are few recorded transfer 
experiments in the marine simulator literature. 
(Muirhead, 1991) 
 
The most abundant source of transfer study experiments 
are in relation to flight simulators, and even here, results 
from studies are surprisingly inconclusive in providing 
hard evidence of positive transfer. (Billings et al, 1975; 
Rolfe, 1991) 
 
Findings from these studies stress that transfer 
experiments need to be carefully designed.  Transfer of 
training experiments are notoriously difficult to control 
(Caird, 1996). Problems involve the lack of experimental 
control, insufficient sample sizes, insufficient time in the 
simulator, insufficient time for evaluating transfer in the 
operational setting, and insensitive measures (Waag, 
1991). 
 
One implication of the classic models of transfer is that 
to be cost-effective, any simulator should be designed so 
that it simulates the operational situation only to the 
extent necessary to provide transfer of the skills required 
by the initial Training Needs Analysis (TNA).  As 
Jackson (1993) puts it: 
 
“It is desirable that simulation fidelity and capability is 
sufficient to ensure the required transfer of training, but 
not to grossly exceed it since this would generally 
increase system cost with no return. 
 
The result of the training needs analysis will be a 
specification of the cues required and their minimum 
fidelity in order to achieve the required transfer of 
training.” 
 
This concept establishes the linkage between transfer and 
the level of fidelity required in order to provide that 
transfer. 
 
In the simulation literature, there are a confusing number 
of definitions of fidelity in terms of realism, equipment 
fidelity, environmental fidelity, behavioural fidelity, 
psychological fidelity, physical similarity and total 
context fidelity. (Allerton and Ross, 1991) 
 
Hays and Singer (1989) reduced these multiple 
definitions to two main dimensions: 
 
“Simulation fidelity is the degree of similarity between 
the training situation and the operational situation which 
is being simulated.  It is a two dimensional measurement 
of this similarity in terms of: (1) the physical 
characteristics…and (2) the functional characteristics.”  
 
Caird (1996) develops this concept to produce the 
following definitions of physical and psychological 
fidelity: 
 
“Physical fidelity has been defined as the degree that the 
physical simulation resembles the operational 
environment, whereas psychological fidelity is the degree 
that a simulation produces the sensory and cognitive 
processes within the trainee as they might occur in 
operational theatres.” 
  
Early simulator design and training development 
progressed in the belief that by producing the highest 
level of physical fidelity possible, such realism alone 
would lead to effective transfer.  As Caird (1996) puts it: 
 
“For decades, the naïve but persistent theory of fidelity 
has guided the fit of simulation systems to training.” 
 
Consequently, more modern thinking recognises that the 
level of fidelity required depends on the nature of the 
skills being trained. Both Jackson (1993) and Caird 
(1996) point out that greater degrees of physical fidelity 
are needed where physical or manual tasks are required, 
whereas functional or operational fidelity is required for 
cognitive tasks. 
 
Furthermore, and this is the crucially important point, the 
level of fidelity required depends on whether physical or 
cognitive tasks are being developed, to the extent that in 
some cases, the lack or distortion of realism may provide 
increased training benefit: 
  
“For cognitive and procedural training there need be 
less emphasis on realism, indeed it may be advantageous 
from a training transfer aspect to remove distracting 
‘realistic’ features. It may even be advantageous to 
actively distort the reality in order to better demonstrate 
the subject matter” (non Euclidean environments i.e. 
outside of the normal laws of geometry). (Jackson, 1993) 
 
“…there is some evidence from flight simulation that 
higher levels of fidelity have little or no effect on skill 
transfer and reductions in fidelity actually improve 
training.  Reductions of complexity may aid working 
memory and attention as skills and knowledge are 
initially acquired. Perhaps errors on the side of more 
fidelity reflect failed attempts to completely understand 
the underlying physical to cognitive mappings. (Caird, 
1996) 
 
In order to ascertain the optimal types of simulation to 
provide training for Crisis Management situations, the 
Warsash research team used a panel of 15 experts and a 
modified “Delphi” technique to investigate the issue. The 
expert panel was drawn from marine simulation 
resources as well as researchers and practitioners from 
other similar safety critical industries. Within this 
project, the Delphi Method was used in a particular way 
termed Policy Delphi (Turoff 1970). The Policy Delphi 
process is a form of policy analysis that provides a 
decision maker with the strongest arguments on each side 
of the issue. A range of future implementation scenarios 
were proposed as training policies that could meet the 
perceived training requirements relating to the handling 
of escalating emergencies. These policies were presented 
to the panel of experts. A subsequent workshop involving 
some of the panel experts was also used to confirm and 
develop their responses.  
 
The following is a summary of the responses received 
from the panel of experts in reply to 19 questions sent to 
them in order to further clarify the main arguments for 
and against the proposed training policies. 
 
Training Policy 1: Using a Full Mission Simulator with 
Team Based Exercises 
 
There was general agreement that training and 
assessment should only ever be undertaken separately.  
 
There were a number of concerns expressed about how 
any form of assessment would be undertaken in order to 
ensure objectivity. 
 
Strengths of this policy option were seen to be the ability 
to undertake team-based activities and the greater fidelity 
of the training environment.  
 
The main weaknesses of this policy option were seen to 
be the high cost of full mission simulators and the 
difficulties in carrying out assessments of individuals 
undertaking team-based activities.  
 
There was general agreement that the tutor should never 
also be the assessor within the same time-frame. 
 
Training Policy 2: Full Mission Simulator with Single 
Trainee Exercises 
 
There was agreement that this policy option was not 
generally beneficial, but could be useful in special 
circumstances such as remedial and pre-team training.  
 
Training Policy 3: Virtual Environments 
 
Although there was still a very positive response to this 
policy option, little empirical evidence was cited to 
support the opinions given. 
 
There was general agreement that the communications 
systems used within this policy option could be 
embedded, as long as they allowed actual voice 
communications, and this could be used in a similar way 
to real communication systems. 
   
Most responses indicated that the co-workers within 
virtual reality training environments should be real and 
not simulated in order to facilitate effective team 
training. However, the possibility was raised that 
simulated co-workers could be used to afford a greater 
variety of training opportunities for team members.  
 
There was general agreement that a high level of fidelity 
was required for certain elements of the virtual 
environment, but there was a wide diversity of opinion as 
to what these elements were. The elements discussed 
were all part of the functional representation of the real 
environment, both physical and procedural. One response 
stated that virtual environment did not have to have a 
high degree of fidelity as long as it allowed for the 
replication of the skills inherent in the task being trained.   
 
Training Policy 4: Desktop Computer Simulation 
 
There was agreement that this policy option required a 
certain level of interactivity to be effective and that an 
increase in interactivity could improve effectiveness and 
efficiency up to a point, beyond which the trainee may 
start to feel confused. 
 
A number of ways of improving interactivity were 
proposed including the: 
  
x creation of multiple training paths 
x provision of training scenarios with more than one 
acceptable outcome 
x use of a facilitator to guide the trainee. 
  
If this policy option could be team-based there was 
general agreement that this would be more beneficial, 
because it would allow trainees to discuss alternative 
solutions. However, one response indicated that if the 
simulation were more team-based it would become more 
difficult to control and it would be more difficult to carry 
out assessments. 
 
It was suggested that, within this policy option, team-
based activity could be achieved by having a facilitator 
guide each training scenario. 
  
There was general agreement that it would be difficult to 
use this policy option to undertake assessments at a 
distance, as this type of assessment would only be based 
upon the training outcome and not the process leading to 
it. The issue of ensuring the authenticity of a candidate 
was seen to be a further difficulty if undertaking 
assessment at a distance.    
 
Training Policy 5:  Table-top simulation 
 
All participants agreed that this policy option could be 
used for training. However, there were arguments made 
both for and against the use of this policy option for 
undertaking assessment.  
 
The argument against was based on the lack of fidelity 
provided by this type of simulation and the difficulty in 
observing relevant competent behaviour in a context that 
is very different from the actual workplace.  
 
The argument for was based on assessment being 
undertaken against those relevant behavioural markers 
that could be observed within the context of the 
simulation.  
 
There was general agreement that it is important to create 
stress during the training and assessment for handling 
escalating emergencies.  
 
A number of ways of creating stress were proposed, the 
most common of these being to introduce time 
constraints into the simulation exercises. Other methods 
discussed for introducing stress were increasing 
information flows, increasing exercise complexity, 
introducing unexpected failures and malfunctions, 
increasing noise levels and the use of role playing 
facilitators. 
  
There was a strong difference of opinion as to whether 
the level of fidelity correlates with the level of stress 
induced within a simulation. A number of responses 
suggested that, unless the simulation had a high level of 
fidelity, stress would not be induced. However, there 
were other responses that strongly opposed this view, 
suggesting that stress is psychologically induced and is 
therefore more dependent upon the exercise participant's 
perception of presence within the simulation scenario, 
than the level of fidelity of the simulation itself. 
 
Training Policy 6: Class Room Based Workshops 
 
There was general agreement that this policy option is 
best suited to training only. 
 
The following strengths were associated with this policy 
option: 
 
x cost beneficial 
x flexible 
x gives the opportunity to discuss operational / 
emergency problems with others 
x tutor guided 
 
The following weaknesses were associated with this 
policy option: 
 
x there is no environment to manage 
x not suitable for the assessment of competence 
 
One response suggested that any weaknesses associated 
with this policy option could be overcome by providing a 
good tutor and ensuring interactivity. There was a wide 
spread of opinion regarding which other methods of 
training this policy option could be usefully used in 
conjunction with. The overall range of opinion covered 
all of the remaining five policy options. One response 
suggested that classroom-based workshops followed by 
practice in context would allow increased transfer. 
 
The following were proposed as being suitable to be 
trained using this policy option: 
 
x appreciation of technical risks 
x knowledge of systems 
x knowledge of procedures 
x theoretical knowledge 
x planning 
x risk management 
x problem solving 
 
The workshop concluded that the inclusion of full 
mission simulation was the only viable assessment 
option. This method is used extensively by the nuclear 
and aviation industries. The argument is that it is the only 
safe method that guarantees that the majority of the cues 
that seem important are present and that the perceived 
required skills may be demonstrated.  
 The search for a single cost-effective training option to 
deliver the required standard of competence may be 
misplaced. The principle enshrined in STCW95 and 
National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs) is that once 
the standard of competence has been defined, how an 
individual reaches that standard is irrelevant. Among a 
number of variables, it is the motivation of the learner 
and the ingenuity of the trainer that will determine the 
most cost-effective training option. In an ideal world, the 
trainer would select the most appropriate method from 
his/her training “toolbox” to suit the individual trainee, 
their learning style, and stage of development identified 
through continuous assessment.  
 
Recent research by Crichton and Rattray (2002) 
describes the potential of Tactical Decision Games 
(TDGs) for crisis management training. TDGs are a low-
cost, low fidelity classroom based simulation that focuses 
on improved decision making and heightened situational 
awareness. Evaluation of their effectiveness and their 
validity and reliability as a competence assessment tool 
is currently underway. 
 
In summary, the most cost-effective training option will 
be determined by a number of “local” factors, including 
the ingenuity of the instructor. At present, however, the 
assessment of competence, particularly for marine 
certification purposes, through the use of currently 
available Full Mission Simulations represents the most 
viable option.  
 
5. ASSESSMENT 
 
All safety critical organisations consider how they would 
manage a crisis situation and undertake some form of 
preparedness training. This training concentrates mostly 
on how to deal with an emergency, where a laid down 
procedure can be put into action. Few of these 
organisations take their training into the realms of a crisis 
situation, where there is no procedure to call upon, and 
where lateral thinking and rapid decision making are 
required of their managers. Even fewer organisations try 
to assess their personnel’s competence in managing a 
crisis.  
 
One of the recommendations of the United Kingdom 
Maritime and Coastguard Agency Project RP467 
(Habberley et al., 2001) was that: 
 
“Crisis management standards of competence are ill 
defined and consequently so are their ‘behavioural 
markers’ by which the standard may be assessed. More 
research is needed in this area, particularly in assessing 
the team working competencies.” 
 
So how do safety critical organisations assess the 
competence of their crisis managers?  How do they do 
this objectively, and what are the assessment criteria they 
use? 
 
Of all the safety critical organisations, the military have 
taken crisis management training and assessment the 
furthest. This is done for a very good reason, as all 
combat situations are, by their very nature, crises.  
Confirming the experience of researchers in other 
domains, Tollcott (1992) states that the two primary 
components of military decision making are:  
 
x situation assessment (what is happening); and 
 
x action selection (what to do about it). 
 
The first of these components requires crisis managers to 
generate hypotheses to account for the information that is 
being received. The second of these components requires 
the generation and evaluation of alternate actions. During 
a crisis these tasks have to be performed within a highly 
demanding decision environment. 
 
In certain circumstances this demanding decision 
environment may become too demanding for the crisis 
manager, and they may find themselves unable to cope. 
This is described by Salas et al. (1996) as a situation 
when: 
 
“environmental demands evoke an appraisal process in 
which perceived demand exceeds resources and results 
in undesirable physiological, psychological behavioural 
or social outcomes.”    
 
So it is important within any safety critical organisation 
to try and determine whether the personnel placed in the 
role of potential crisis manager will be able to cope when 
a crisis arises. 
 
Following their participation in a major US military 
research project, ‘ Tactical Decision Making Under 
Stress’, Cannon-Bowers and Salas (1998) proposed a set 
of knowledge, skill and attitude requirements for teams 
to work effectively during crisis situations: 
 
 
Team Knowledge Requirements: 
 
cue strategy association 
knowledge of team-mate characteristics 
shared task models 
knowledge of team interaction patterns 
task sequencing 
 
Team Skill Requirements: 
 
adaptability 
shared situational awareness 
mutual performance monitoring 
communication 
decision making 
interpersonal skills 
team leadership 
assertiveness 
conflict resolution 
 
Team Attitude Requirements: 
 
Collective efficacy 
shared vision 
team cohesion 
mutual trust 
collective orientation 
importance of teamwork 
 
If indeed these are the requirements for an effective crisis 
management team, the assessment of competence in 
crisis management based upon these requirements is a 
daunting task. If, as discussed in Section 4 of this paper, 
assessment should be undertaken in an environment that 
closely resembles the real world situation, the capture of 
data to evaluate against assessment criteria relating to all 
of these requirements is a truly enormous task. 
 
Through their use of war games, the military attempt this 
task. They use large numbers of assessors, dispersed 
throughout the war gaming environment during an 
assessment exercise. After the assessment exercise, the 
assessors meet to discuss their observations during the 
exercise, and to evaluate the actions of the team against 
set assessment criteria. Examples of these criteria are: 
 
‘was there a good flow of information into the control 
position at all times’ 
 
and 
 
‘was the incident picture well kept’ 
 
These criteria are assessed as having been either ‘met’ or 
‘not met’. A discussion is then held between assessors to 
give an overall assessment of how the team performed. 
Due to the severe time restraints imposed on the 
assessment process, because of the operational 
requirements of the military, and the sheer complexity of 
the war gaming environment, subjective assessments are 
inevitable. However, because of the large number of 
assessors used, effective assessments can be achieved 
through moderation. 
 
The civil aviation industry has recently been undertaking 
research into the possibility of assessing the non-
technical skills of aircrew. Non-technical skills are 
defined as those skills, in addition to technical skills, 
required for competence in crisis management. Through 
the Joint Aviation Requirements Translation and 
Elaboration of Legislation research project (JAR TEL 
Consortium, 2001), a methodology for assessing the non-
technical skills of aircrew, by observing individual overt 
behaviours, has been proposed. 
 
The cockpit environment is very different to that of a war 
gaming environment, but the non-technical skills of co-
operation, leadership and management, situational 
awareness and decision making, as metrics for assessing 
competence in crisis management, are common to both. 
A major difference between the assessment of 
competence in crisis management within the military 
context and the civil aviation context is that within the 
military context a team is assessed, whereas within the 
civil aviation context it is the assessment of an individual 
working within a team that is undertaken. 
 
The JAR TEL non-technical skills or ‘NOTECHS’ 
assessment framework provides definitions of the non-
technical skills to be assessed and gives the assessor 
examples of overt behaviours that indicate good or poor 
practice of these skills. 
 
An example skill element under the category of ‘Co-
operation’ is “team building and maintaining”. 
 
An example of an overt behaviour indicating poor 
practice of this skill element is: 
 
“Keeps barriers between crew members.” 
 
An example of an overt behaviour indicating good 
practice of this skill element is: 
 
“Encourages inputs and feedback from others (lowers 
the barriers).”  
 
Although the ‘NOTECHS’ framework has moved the 
assessment of competence in crisis management, within 
the context of civil aviation, towards a more objective 
foundation, the experimental results of inter-rater 
reliability trials showed that in the more complex 
assessment scenarios there were significantly divergent 
assessments. 
 
The JAR TEL report states that there are some strongly 
held reservations, by some members of the aviation 
fraternity, about the very concept of the assessment of 
non-technical skills. One of the prime reservations being 
that: 
 
“it is felt that the criteria on which assessment is based 
are largely subjective and thus cannot easily be 
monitored for fairness and accuracy”  
 
Through the STCW Code Table A-V/2 (IMO, 1995), the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has provided 
the competence specification of a minimum standard of 
competence in crisis management and human behaviour 
for those officers who have responsibilities for 
passengers. As within the civil aviation industry, these 
competencies relate to individuals working within a 
team. The required underpinning knowledge, 
understanding and proficiency, are stated for each 
competence, along with methods for demonstrating 
competence and criteria for evaluating competence. 
 
IMO does not differentiate between crises and 
emergencies, and the Table A-V/2 relates primarily to the 
management of emergencies, citing the use of procedures 
and actions in accordance with established plans as a 
criterion for evaluating competence.  
 
The assessment criteria given in Table A-V/2 of STCW 
95 are also highly subjective, an example being: 
 
“Information given to individuals, emergency response 
teams and passengers is accurate, relevant and timely.” 
 
From the examples above it can be seen that safety 
critical organisations undertake the assessment of 
competence in crisis management in very different ways. 
These have been summarised in Table 1 at the end of this 
paper. 
 
Experience within the military context has shown that the 
crisis management assessment framework used has been 
both fair and effective. However, this has been achieved 
through the use of a huge amount of resources, both 
within the assessment environment and the assessor 
team. 
 
Within the context of civil aviation the use of overt 
behavioural markers as criteria for assessing competence 
in crisis management skills has been attempted, and has 
been shown to be successful when used to assess 
personnel within simple, non-crisis, scenarios. However, 
the current assessment framework has been shown to be 
unreliable when used to assess personnel within 
complex, crisis, scenarios. 
 
Within the merchant marine context, the assessment 
framework for crisis management and human behaviour 
is too open to interpretation to be effective. 
 
Any framework for the assessment of competence in 
crisis management within the context of the merchant 
marine would not have the resources available to it that 
the military has. The civil aviation assessment 
framework for non-technical skills, although feasible to 
apply within the merchant marine context, has not yet 
been shown to be reliable in assessing competence in 
crisis management. 
 
In order to provide the international maritime community 
with an understanding of how a behavioural marker 
system could be applied for the assessment of 
competence in crisis management of merchant marine 
officers, research is currently being undertaken at 
Warsash Maritime Centre. 
 
The aims of this research are: 
 
x To understand how behavioural markers can be 
used to objectively assess competence in crisis 
management of merchant marine officers. 
 
x To understand the methods by which these 
behavioural markers can be elicited and 
assessed. 
 
Data is being collected and analysed using ethnographic 
study techniques during simulated crisis scenarios within 
a high-fidelity ships engine control room environment. 
 
It is hoped that this research will lead to the development 
of an assessment framework that can be applied within 
the merchant marine context for the fair and effective 
assessment of competence in crisis management. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The characteristics of crisis situations in which decisions 
have to be made under stress by often experienced 
individuals are uncertainty, unpredictability and danger. 
Situational awareness is incomplete, and constantly 
changing. However, the consequences of decisions and 
actions based on poor situational awareness are 
potentially catastrophic. The key skills therefore of 
successful crisis management are situation awareness and 
decision making. 
 
Training in crisis management is likely to require a much 
more demanding approach to practise the skills required 
in these situations than procedurally based emergency 
training. 
 
The direct training of crisis management skills is based 
on the belief that by exposing individuals or teams to a 
variety of simulated crisis scenarios, their mental models 
of situations will be enriched, thus enhancing their 
situational awareness techniques and their repertoires of 
decision making. The key to this approach is in the 
“richness” of the mental models developed by the 
individual or team. 
 
The results of a survey of marine and other experts in 
simulator training suggest that a variety of simulation 
based options have different strengths and weaknesses 
for crisis management training.  The most cost-effective 
training option, therefore, is likely to be determined by a 
number of factors. However, at present, the only really 
viable option for the assessment of competence, for 
marine certification purposes, is in the use of full mission 
simulation.  
 
A comparison of assessment methods used in other 
safety critical organisations reveals that the assessment of 
competence in crisis management is largely open to 
subjective interpretation, even where criteria exist. This 
situation is moderated, in some cases such as the 
military, by the number of assessors used. Another 
interesting difference between civilian and military 
practice is that the military are often assessing the 
competence of the team whereas, certainly in the 
maritime context, it is the performance of the individual 
within the team that is of primary concern for the 
purposes of certification. 
 
Research is currently being conducted at Warsash 
Maritime centre in order to provide the international 
maritime community with an understanding of how a 
behavioural marker system could be applied for the 
assessment of competence in crisis management of 
merchant marine officers. 
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF THE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS FOR ASSESSING COMPETENCE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT WITHIN DIFFERENT 
SAFETY CRITICAL ORGANISIATIONS 
 
Context  Assessment Environment Assessor(s)   Assessed Assessment Criteria Remarks
Military High-fidelity War Game 
within real environment 
Multiple 
Distributed throughout 
assessment environment 
Team  Prescriptive and detailed,
but complexity of 
assessment environment 
leads to subjective 
interpretation 
 Fairness achieved through 
moderation 
 
Civil Aviation High-fidelity simulator Single Individual working within 
team 
Overt behavioural markers 
with examples given of 
good and poor practice 
Assessment framework 
difficult to use in complex 
scenarios leading to 
divergence of assessment 
 
Merchant Marine Simulations onboard and 
table top 
Single Individual working within 
team 
Prescriptive, but very 
open to subjective 
interpretation 
 
Assessment framework 
too open to interpretation 
by assessing authority 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
